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Abstract
Karsten Harries’ book, The Ethical Function of Architecture,
raises the question of how architecture can be interpretive of and
for our time.  Part of Harries’ pursuit of this question is done in
dialogue with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, whose
evocatively expressed ontology of building and dwelling
recovered, in philosophical and poetic terms, the power of
buildings to symbolize and interpret the most fundamental truths
of being and human existence.  The present essay identifies
contributions to this hermeneutic and ontological approach to
architecture drawn from the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer,
emphasizing Gadamer’s notions of play (Spiel), symbol, and the
relation of the present to the past.  While Gadamer expanded
upon Heidegger’s hermeneutic, he also diverged from Heidegger
in ways that mitigate some of the difficulties that Harries and
others have found with Heidegger’s archaism, rural romanticism,
and singularity of philosophical focus.
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1.  The Ethical Function of Architecture
Among the many powerful contributions that Karsten Harries’
book, The Ethical Function of Architecture, has made to the
philosophical study of that art is his formulation of a central,
guiding question: How can architecture interpret our time? 
Because the character of a time and a culture is an “ethos,” such
an interpretive function is the “ethical” function of
architecture.”[1]  But because an interpretation seeks what is
important, bringing normative possibilities to light, architecture
also connects with ethics as a form of philosophical reflection on
moral principles and practices.  It is important to Harries that
ethico-architectural reflection in either of these senses avoid
compromising the unique character of architecture as a form of
art.  Architecture speaks but does not do so discursively.  Like
the Oracle of Delphi, it neither affirms nor denies but indicates
through connotation, evocation, and symbolism.  Whatever in its
meaning can be voiced in language must also be experienced in
its visual, tactile, haptic, and kinetic sensuousness.[2]
If the interpretation is for a particular time period, questioning
the ethical function of architecture initiates questions of human
history and historicity.  More specifically, one must consider
whether modernity’s and modern architecture’s dramatic break
with traditions of the past, and, to some extent, with the very
idea of the authority of tradition, has enhanced or inhibited the
flourishing of our humanity.  This, in turn, implies a corollary
question of how architecture, in light of the successes and
failures of modernity, should relate to its own past.[3]
2.  The Relevance of Heidegger and Gadamer
A central interlocutor in Harries’ pursuit of all of these questions
is Martin Heidegger, who thought deeply on matters of
interpretation, history, language, and artistic creation.  For
Heidegger, it was not merely that there are human subjects who
interpret objects, but the very nature of worldly existence was
hermeneutical.  It was always caught up in countless worldly
involvements, and it pursued interpretation by making explicit
the ways of being in which experience was always moving.  At
the heart of Heidegger’s thinking on these questions was the
primitive phenomenon of openness to the very being (Sein) of
beings (Seindes).  For him, meditation on the question of being
can comprehend the coming to be and passing of beings, their
intelligibility as well as their dark mystery, more fully than was
possible through mainstream Western traditions of metaphysics
and science.[4]
My purpose here is to make connections between Harries’
project and another voice that has been heard regularly, though
not as frequently, in this hermeneutic conversation. Hans-Georg
Gadamer did not produce writings specifically dedicated to
architecture, but his hermeneutic theory, philosophy of art, and
incidental observations on architecture have been appropriated
by architectural theorists in fruitful ways.[5]  Gadamer’s most
famous philosophical work, Truth and Method, sought to raise
the art of hermeneutics, with its long traditions in the fields of
rhetoric, theology, and law, further to the level of ontology; that
is, to identify “hermeneutic” as a structure or a natural dynamic
that shapes every form of thinking and being.[6]
This notion of an ontological hermeneutic structure was central
to Gadamer’s appropriation of Heidegger in the areas of thought
that are now used extensively in the study of architecture.  One
of these is the issue of the nature of artistic meaning itself, which
must be understood as different from discursive thinking and
conceptual speaking, but which possesses an open and
exploratory quality that can pull hardened and unimaginative
conceptual thinking out of the ruts into which it habitually falls.
 This is the function of art as “play” or “game” (Spiel).  Another
is the ability of artistic form to point beyond itself, to make its
place overt within a nexus of meanings in a way that invokes the
whole of that nexus and its mysterious origins.  This is the
symbolic function of art.  A third area is that of historical
understanding, that is, the role of hermeneutic investigations in
making sense of the past in relation to the present and future.
As I review these three themes in both Heideggerian and
Gadamerian hermeneutics, I shall also have an evaluative thesis
in view, for Gadamer is useful not only in his development of
Heideggerian ideas but also in his departures from his mentor.
These points of departure offer ways of overcoming certain
limitations or impasses that are encountered in the classic
Heideggerian approach.  Harries identified such obstacles in some
of Heidegger’s cryptic terminology and his inclination toward a
kind of rural romanticism.  However, I want to emphasize a
more general obstacle that arises from the claim often made that
Heidegger is a thinker of a single thought.  While Harries,
Christian Norberg-Schulz, Robert Mugerauer, Alberto Pérez-
Gómez, and a number of others have had great success in
developing interpretive frameworks for architecture out of
Heideggerian philosophy, they have had to work, in some
measure, in resistance to Heidegger, himself, whose reflections
move insistently along a single ontological itinerary, and who
was never consistently attracted to the idea of producing a
“philosophy of” anything.[7] There are important ways in which
Gadamer can be seen as modifying Heideggerian thinking so as
to mitigate this resistance.
3.  Heidegger and the Philosophy of Architecture
Heidegger sought to recover architecture’s extraordinary capacity
for meaning from modernity’s habit of reducing architecture to a
form of functional equipment or technology. The strategy for this
recovery was a return to origins.  The ultimate origin was, for
Heidegger, the event of “opening” or “clearing” or “lighting” in
being by which the being of entities is disclosed in an already
temporally ordered range of mutual involvements.[8]  I consider
this “opening” the primary phenomenon of all Heideggerian
philosophizing.  To think of it as a quality of objects or subjects
distorts the phenomenon by reducing it to something secondary,
granting subjects or objects priority to the very event that
discloses them.  Likewise, to think of the primary phenomenon
as an event within the world is to incoherently place lighted
reality before that by which it is lit.  The opening, we can say, is
an opening to being and of being.
While in this context  being is not something other than the
ontological dimension of entities, to preserve the primacy of the
primary phenomenon it is necessary to think in terms of an
ontological difference, of being as more fundamental than, and
as irreducible to, beings and their qualities.  For being is not a
particular being, nor the totality of beings, nor a supreme being. 
It is beings in their enigmatic lighting, the totality of beings in
view of the uncanny granting of that totality, and the locus of the
clearing inasmuch as the event of clearing has occurred.  In this
sense, being is obvious in some ways to everyone but is also
deeply mysterious and typically obscured, for the clearing is
bounded by horizons of common sense, the philosophical
assumptions of a tradition, and the distractions of everyday life.
While architecture has proximate origins in any number of
practical needs, its ultimate origin is in the event that brings
these practical realities to light.  Dwelling within buildings arises
out of dwelling within a lighted opening on Earth.  Architecture
that is attuned to this deeper origin seeks to explore it, to
announce somehow the event of the opening of a world of
involvements.  This is not a calculation or a deliberation; it is
work at the limits of the practical concerns of those who
determine the programs of buildings.  It is an encounter with the
limits of the concepts by which Western metaphysics has
catalogued the totality of worldly entities in ways that keep their
mystery from shining through.  Language itself often comes up
short of the task, but the expressions of the poet, the musician,
and the visual artist struggle to articulate that which has eluded
prose.  In working at the limits of language and by saying what
one had not thought possible to say, creative expression can
illuminate how every truth-statement, every disclosure, every
aletheia emerges from a realm of hiddenness (lethe) which is
latent with ever-further potentialities of expression.[9]  In the
play of the poet, the artist, and the architect, we can experience
the ways of the world with an incomparable sensitivity to the
mystery of their coming to pass, and so to the ontological
enigma of the dwelling of all beings on Earth.[10]
To approach architecture from this perspective is to seek to
revitalize its symbols.  Drawing on Heidegger’s language of the
fourfold (“world,” “earth,” “mortals,” and “divinities”), his notion
of “thing” as gathering of world, and his poetic renderings of the
bridge and the threshold as capturing the force, the unity, and
the fragility of existence,[11] Norberg-Schulz, Harries, and
others have developed vocabularies that recover architecture’s
symbolic power to befriend a landscape, to gather its elements,
to connect the sky and the earth, to embrace the dark depths of
mortal dwelling, and to announce transcendence with open and
soaring forms.  Such symbolisms draw upon religious traditions
even as Heidegger’s philosophical convictions kept him from
overtly embracing them.  Heidegger believed that one may
perceive the power of the symbols in the evident mysteries of
ordinary experience.
Heidegger’s philosophy is hermeneutical in several senses.
Because it rejects both objectification and subjective
introspection as starting points, looking instead to the
interrelations that precede subject-object distinctions, it must
progress by illuminating those involvements from within, revising
the starting point of inquiry as the inquiry discovers the larger
pattern of these involvements.  It is hermeneutical also in that it
interprets the past, not from a neutral vantage point, but in a
manner that takes up the questions of previous thinkers, sees
their strengths and their weaknesses as questions, and critiques
these thinkers, often radically and polemically, out of this
participation in the direction of their inquiry.  But it is
hermeneutical, too, in the task of “retrieval,” in seeing what, in
the centuries-long history of questioning and symbolizing being,
can be brought forward into an invigorated pursuit of that
question.[12]
4.  Difficulties with the Heideggerian Approach
This particular combination of retrieval and critique in
Heidegger’s writings on art and architecture is part of what
makes those interpretations so insightful and commanding, but
the combination also poses difficulties for those who would
expand upon Heidegger.  For example, Harries pointed out that
the archaic-sounding language of the fourfold, while it provides a
potent framework for grasping elemental meaning in traditional
architecture, does not seem to be well- suited to modern forms
of building that are thoroughly mediated by modern
technology.[13]  Given the number of criticisms that Heidegger
made of modernity and the technological mentality per se, it is
easy to find oneself simply at a loss as to how architecture might
move forward, along Heideggerian lines, from where it presently
stands.  
Further complicating this conundrum is a certain romanticism
that is discernable in Heidegger’s use of the examples of classic
Greek architecture and the traditional farmhouses of his native
Black Forest.  On the positive side, these examples show an
insistence on architecture that is fully identified with its
environment, while also confidently asserting its role as the
ecstatic articulation of the meaningfulness of that environment. 
But the negative side is very negative indeed, for to be
romantically traditionalist in rural Germany of the 1930s was to
reinforce a very anti-Semitic culture preparing to commit crimes
against humanity.  To engage in a romantic retrieval of classical
architecture for the Germany of the 1930s was to endorse what
Albert Speer achieved for Hitler:  a Nazification of Greek and
Roman architectural symbolism.[14]  Heidegger’s preferred
examples thus echo, in a distressing way, the foolish and
malicious bond he made with that genocidal regime during the
period of its rise to power.
But a further philosophical difficulty arises from the singularity of
Heidegger’s focus on the question of being and his insistence on
a particular understanding of ontological difference.  Heidegger
was constantly on guard against any kind of philosophy or
methodology that would turn the primary phenomenon, the
clearing in being, the event of finite transcendence, into
something secondary.  And yet every time one pursues a
“philosophy of” something, one risks doing exactly that.  The
object, the activity, or the discipline suddenly becomes the
primary phenomenon and the question of being becomes an
adjunct to that phenomenon.  For Heidegger, any such
movement manifested a forgetfulness of being.  Hence, while he
regularly used metaphysics, science, and art as ways into the
question of being, Heidegger’s aim was never to develop a
metaphysics, a philosophy of science, or a philosophy of art.  For
him, movement into the being question was more or less a one-
way movement.[15]  For this reason, while authors who have
used Heidegger to analyze architecture and its history are to be
praised for the remarkable, ground-breaking work they have
done in turning his limited writings on the subject into a
comprehensive theoretical approach, to some extent they have
always had to work  against the grain of Heideggerian thinking. 
There will always be Heideggerian purists on hand who will argue
that such work has failed to be fully mindful of ontological
difference, that it has slipped back into an a kind of existential
phenomenology, rather than meeting Heidegger’s ontology on its
own terms.
5.  A Gadamerian Approach to Architecture
What was important for Gadamer about Heidegger’s forays into
ancient philosophy, mythological language, word etymologies,
and the arts of poetry, painting, and architecture was not the
particular terminological formulations that emerged from them,
for one must notice how restless Heidegger was with all such
formulations and how much his thinking demanded ever-new
manners of expression.[16]  What was important for Gadamer
was the pattern of critique and retrieval, that is, Heidegger’s
conviction that something had been overlooked in all the
ordinary categories of philosophy, science, and the arts. 
Therefore, Gadamer’s appreciation of Heidegger was not found in
any reproduction of Heidegger’s own particular ways of writing. 
Gadamer did not invoke the fourfold, did not engage in the
“destruction” of the history of metaphysics, and did not even
employ the language of “Dasein,” committing what he called the
“holy sin” of bringing back the word “consciousness.”[17]  
Gadamer’s appropriation of Heidegger was embodied instead in
the way he developed the structures or patterns that I named at
the outset and have used, to a certain extent, in organizing my
comments on Heidegger: (1) the structure of play or game in
which one is caught up in things in a way that is liberating while
also directed; (2) the structure of symbolic mimesis that reveals
and conceals meaning, thereby evoking the ontological structures
that receive so many different Heideggerian names, such as
 finite transcendence, being and nothing, and world and earth;
and (3) the pattern of interpretation by which one is taken up in
the concerns that drive a text or a work and seeks to make
sense of the work by sharing in its struggles to understand and
communicate.  Let me now elaborate briefly on each of these
structures, play, symbol, and interpretation, seeking to show
under each of these headings how Gadamer exhibited a greater
openness to modern forms of art and architecture than did
Heidegger.
6.  Architecture and Play
Gadamer was certainly not the first aesthetician to focus on the
curious nature of play.  Others, notably Kant, defined aesthetic
experience in terms of an open-ended play of elements which,
though it is liberated from making conceptual determinations,
nevertheless exhibits a strong telos and a great deal of form.
 But Gadamer provided an added degree of force to the notion of
play by connecting it back to philosophy’s original inspirations in
Socratic dialogue, what the Platonic dialogues describe as
“serious play,” wherein an agreement to postpone forming
opinions and making decisions grants the interlocutors a freedom
to explore ideas and arguments wherever they might lead
without forcing those arguments to serve a predetermined
outcome.  Socrates understood that the state of inquiry is in a
curious position between knowing and unknowing, where truth
and fiction are mixed together and intelligibility emerges when
one seeks what is common among many instances, yet also
where the verification of that intelligibility requires returning
again and again to the instances to inquire of them more fully. 
The truth of art is allied with this in-between state of inquiring
consciousness.[18]  By exploring and communicating insight, the
work of art engages one in a process of generalizing and
idealizing, but Gadamer, disagreeing with Hegel, insisted that the
ideal content of a work cannot subsist without the artwork itself. 
Indeed, it is a defining characteristic of an exceptional work of
art that it constantly insists on its instantial uniqueness.  It
points to meanings beyond itself but always by continually
drawing one back into itself.[19]
In this sense, play is not the privileged possession of any style or
period; it is present wherever there is success in artistic
endeavor.  Hence, one can find Gadamer endorsing a wide range
of modern, abstract, and experimental art forms.  He did not
tend to read them as symptoms of modernity’s shortcomings. 
On the contrary, the best among them do what great art always
does: challenge and inspire the imagination of an audience at a
particular point in history.  The history of modern art is replete
with innovators who understood this, and who regarded their
artistic task as no different from those of the artist of any age,
inasmuch as any artist must speak to his or her own time
without stepping backward from the achievements of previous
innovators.  Works of this sort speak to their contemporaries, in
part by transcending the limitations of the contemporary
horizon.  They relate to the past not by imitation but by
rediscovering and renewing the aspirations and insights of the
creators of the past.   
The emergence of the abstract styles of the twentieth century is
noteworthy in this regard.  At their best, these styles found
thoroughly modern ways to intensify the symbolic
communication of paintings, sculptures, and architectural works. 
The non-verbal work of art, wrote Gadamer, is not speechless
because it has nothing to say, but is like one who stammers for
having too much to say.[20]  This is all the more true in
successful artistic abstraction.  By representing no single thing,
the abstract work is better able to suggest many things at once
by condensing multiple meanings into itself so as to participate in
many levels of being all at once.  In early cultures this
condensation is the source of the magic attached to religious
symbols, for example the ability for a stone figurine to possess
divine powers.  But in some respects the same homologization of
cosmic hierarchies is at work in every living symbol.  The symbol
summons the chthonic, the natural, the human, and the divine
all at once, gathering them all into a palpable unity.[21]
7.  Architecture as Interpreted and Interpreting
Since architecture is symbolic and ontologically disclosive in the
way described in section 6, it must be an interpretive
undertaking for Gadamer no less than for Heidegger.  But
because it is connotative and multivalent in its disclosure, it also
calls for interpretation.  A philosophically hermeneutic response
to that call works on the assumption that we as interpreters are
always immersed in, and implicated in, the realities that the
architecture seeks to embody.  A hermeneutical approach
realizes that both the work and its interpreter are products of
history and are shaped by a horizon of questions, concepts,
assumptions, affects, habits, stories, images, and convictions
that only fully enters our conscious awareness through
something like a Socratic dialogue with the past.  To call this
hermeneutic approach to culture “conservative,” “nostalgic,” or
“naïve” is to miss its point.  The relevant form of naïveté, in
Gadamer’s view, is in the belief that by being a modern one can
simply step out of history, that one can, by the use of some
method or by simple declaration, live in a world of one’s own
fashioning.[22]
In a Socratic dialogue with the past—questioning it and
questioning with it, putting one’s own horizon always at stake in
the process—one may find ways of allowing the insights of the
past to speak again.  Such an effort is neither a return to the
horizon of the past nor an arbitrary plundering of the past.  It is
an original movement, a seeking after origins that yields
something both old and new.  It is an attempt to become aware
of manifold layers of meaning that are sedimented in our
language and our imaginations, and that echo through us no
matter how original we fancy our creativity to be.  This
historically-sensitized hermeneutic project does not confine one
to the thought of a single philosopher or even the discipline of
philosophy.  It is what all of the humanities should be doing and
is the key, according to Gadamer, to reestablishing the authority
of the humanities in education.  At the root of this authority is
the sense that understanding and truth about human life can
come from exercising human powers of rational reflection on
one’s own experienced humanity in nature, in community, and in
history.
The contemporary circumstances of architecture provide
interesting opportunities in this regard.  The spirit of modernism
is no less passionate than ever, and yet modernism, by its own
measures, at least, is by now something quite old.  Information
technology has transformed cultural life in ways that were
unimaginable just decades ago, and yet these same technologies
also grant a kind of unprecedented access to information about
the past.  The technologies of design, fabrication, construction,
and imaging always threaten to overwhelm architectural
creativity with endless mechanical reproduction, or, in the terms
of Dalibor Vesely, of dividing the functional and aesthetic
qualities of buildings from their potential for integral
meaning.[23]  Yet these same technologies can be employed in
producing extraordinarily singular works, thus making possible a
consciously hermeneutical way of creating architecture.
8.  The Hermeneutic Dimension of Steven Holl’s Chapel of
St. Ignatius
To illustrate one way in which this hermeneutical approach might
be realized, let us consider a well-known building by the
philosophically astute architect, Steven Holl.  The Chapel of St.
Ignatius, built in 1997 on the campus of Seattle University, is
best known for its explicit use of Merleau-Ponty’s hermeneutic of
seeing and embodiment and his ontology of the intertwining of
the visible and the invisible.[24]  But the building also implicitly
represents the kind of hermeneutic that I have been discussing
here.  In the conception of the building, Holl attempted to realize
a type of modern architecture that would exploit all of the
possibilities of modern forms and materials but would be
particularly attuned to human scale, the human senses, and the
work of the human hand.
The design of the building exhibits a simplicity in its overall
conception, yet it employed computer-aided design and
manufacture to create a uniquely sculpted blend of forms.  More
important, from the outset these forms were made to serve as
guiding metaphors.  From the writings of Ignatius of Loyola, Holl
drew the classic image of the divine in the metaphor of light from
above.  The seven key elements of the building program were
conceived as vessels of different colors, filtering and emitting
colored light, and lying, in various positions, in a stone box.
Photo courtesty of Steven Holl Architects.
An insistence on thus organizing the project around sculptural
possibilities and guiding metaphors assured that there would be
an element of play active in all subsequent handling of program,
floor plan, and choice of materials.
Yet it was by keeping all of these elements in a protracted fluid
state, while adding further metaphorical associations into the
design, that the finished building came to be not simply the
architectural expression of a metaphor but a compounding of
multiple, multivalent metaphors.  Through its vaulting and the
creation of intriguing patterns of light, the building evokes
associations of air and sky;
through the light reflected off the polished floors, the interior
repeats the aqueous surface of the reflecting pool.
  One almost feels oneself afloat, and can even imagine the
curving white interior walls as billowing sails and the building as
a sea-going vessel.
Yet encountering these heavy walls from the exterior, trimmed
with yellow stone, one thinks of earth.
  The curving rooflines, with their tilting, windowed faces, seem
to be reaching up, from their heavy enclosure, to the light,
communicating, across the reflecting pool, to the rising bell
tower. 
As these forms gather earth and sky, so they gather the regional
elements through the use of such materials as local basalt and
cedar.
Thus the building embodies elemental symbolisms that are fully
comprehensible in Heideggerian terms, while making extensive
use of modern forms and technologies.  This is the kind of
direction that Gadamer’s hermeneutic endorsed.
As Gadamer sought a resurgence of the humanities, Holl set
himself a goal of “humanizing the modern.”
He did this not only by designing from the perspective of the
bodily experience of the building but by incorporating all sorts of
local hand crafts into its details, including the hammered cedar of
the doors, altar, and other objects; the hand-texturing of the
plastered walls; 
and the use of hand-blown glass in the lighting.
The result is that one experiences the mark of the human hand
at every turn, even as one always feels that one is in a very
modern place.  
As the human body is reflected in the chapel, so is the working
of human history.  The building’s colors bring out associations
with old Roman churches, as does its large, processional door,
which is opened by grasping a bronze handle sculpted in the
shape of a priest’s stole. 
Though the walls and floors are of concrete, they were
engineered to crack like old edifices. 
Colored light recalls a stained glass window as it falls on the wall
like a Mondrian or Suprematist painting.

  Nothing about the building seems nostalgic for Gothic forms,
and yet from certain angles one sees a Gothic arch. 
Nothing about the altar seems traditional, and yet from a certain
angle its legs form the shapes of an alpha and an omega.  
By such means the chapel participates in the ongoing
interpretation of the past, challenging those who experience it
with its modernism, yet making present recollections of centuries
of architectural and Catholic tradition.  The presence of the past
emerges gradually in the course of interacting with the building
and experiencing its purposes through moments of recognition
that render its unique forms strangely familiar.  The work
surrenders nothing of its freedom in choosing, by that freedom,
to find the richness of the past reverberating throughout its
every feature.
None of these features, I might note, needed to introduce
excessive costs.  Indeed, modern technologies and materials can
be recruited to limit costs in some areas so as to free the budget
in others.  In this chapel, for example, the walls and floors are
concrete, and the color effects are mostly achieved economically
by bouncing the light off of unseen painted surfaces.  The limits
on creating a highly symbolic modern building are perhaps more
a matter of limits of imagination and on the permissions that
architects are given, rather than limitations on budgets. 
9.  Conclusion: Philosophy and Architectural Ethos
An interpretation such as the one I have been offering of Holl’s
chapel aims to identify the disclosive power of the work, and
thus be compatible with a Heideggerian search for elemental
meanings in architecture’s worldly involvements.  But the
description does so with the sense that every form of speaking
about the building can contain such elemental meanings,
including discussions of such practical matters as program, choice
of materials, construction methods, and even budgetary
considerations.  A Gadamerian approach avoids the esoteric
terminology that comes from the Heideggerian project of
“destruction” of common sense and disciplinary ways of
speaking, preferring instead to emphasize the complementary
Heideggerian option of the “retrieval” of potential meanings
latent within all of these ways of speaking.[25]  A strength of
Holl’s building is, in fact, that the spiritual and symbolic purpose
of the building was present in every one of these considerations.
Any retrieval of meaning occurs across historical distance.  This
implies that the grasp of that meaning is never simply a
repetition but must always let the work speak again in a new
context, encountering the horizon out of which the meanings
were formed by means of the horizon through which they must
be understood.  Such a blending of horizons becomes artistically
explicit in a work such as Holl’s, in which architectural and
spiritual traditions are interpreted through modernism, yielding,
by the same stroke, an interpretation of the possibilities of
modernism.
The Gadamerian interpretation acknowledges the strength of
Holl’s building out of a sense of poetic dwelling on Earth.  But the
Gadamerian account must emphasize the uniqueness of
architectural forms of play, forms that compound multiple
connotations in such a way as to invite many kinds of verbal
expression without ever being exhausted by them.  To verbalize
the ethos of works of architecture in a philosophical way serves
the worthy goal of bringing these works into a wider sphere of
cultural communication and understanding.  Yet Gadamer’s
hermeneutics remind us that, in any such verbal form of
communication, it is not the concepts alone that carry the
meaning of the work.  Nor is it the work alone, considered apart
from the process of its creation and appreciation that holds the
meaning, or the inner inspiration of the architects, designers,
and builders.  It is in the way that all of these are engaged with
the world of meaning and truth, and are engaged by it,
mediating that world through a uniquely architectural manner of
seeking.
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